The U.S. Court of International Trade and the U.S. International Trade Commission After Ten Years -- A Personal View by Toupin, James A.
Fordham International Law Journal
Volume 14, Issue 1 1990 Article 3
The U.S. Court of International Trade and the
U.S. International Trade Commission After
Ten Years – A Personal View
James A. Toupin∗
∗
Copyright c©1990 by the authors. Fordham International Law Journal is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj
The U.S. Court of International Trade and the
U.S. International Trade Commission After
Ten Years – A Personal View
James A. Toupin
Abstract
This Article will present come impressions of the effect on the U.S. International Trade Com-
mission of key elements of the 1979-1980 reforms contained in the Trade Agreements Act of 1979
and the Customs Courts Act of 1980. The reforms established the current system for the judicial
review of antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. This Article will first address some
of the observable impacts of the judicial review system on the operation of the Commission and
will then attempt to examine the operation of the U.S. Court of International Trade as an expert
tribunal with first-level appellate responsibility over trade cases. Finally, this article will present
views on the potential effects of the current judicial review process on litigants.
THE U.S. COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
TRADE AND THE U.S.
INTERNATIONAL TRADE
COMMISSION AFTER TEN
YEARS-A PERSONAL VIEWt
James A. Toupin *
INTRODUCTION
This Article will present some impressions of the effect on
the U.S. International Trade Commission (the "Commission")
of key elements of the 1979-1980 reforms contained in the
Trade Agreements Act of 1979 (the "1979 Trade Act")' and
the Customs Courts Act of 1980 (the "1980 Act").2 These re-
forms established the current system for the judicial review of
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations. This Ar-
ticle will first address some of the observable impacts of the
judicial review system on the operation of the Commission and
will then attempt to examine the operation of the U.S. Court of
International Trade (the "CIT") as an expert tribunal with
first-level appellate responsibility over trade cases. Finally, this
Article will present views on the potential effects of the current
judicial review process on litigants.
As this Article will make clear, the frequency with which
the CIT has held the Commission to have erred is not determi-
native of the effectiveness of the current system of judicial re-
view. The current system ofjudicial review would have impor-
t This Article is adapted from a paper submitted to the Sixth Annual Judicial
Conference of the U.S. Court of International Trade on November 3, 1989. The
paper formed the basis for the Author's participation in a panel discussion at that
conference on the subject of how the courts, agencies, and litigants have responded
to the judicial review process established by the Trade Agreements Act of 1979 and
the Customs Courts Act of 1980. The views expressed in this Article are personal to
the Author and do not necessarily represent those of the U.S International Trade
Commission.
* Assistant General Counsel for Litigation and Special Projects, U.S. Interna-
tional Trade Commission. The Author wishes to express his thanks to Katherine
Traxler, Mattie Luckett, and John Allen for their assistance in the preparation of this
Article.
1. Codified at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988) [hereinafter 1979 Trade
Act].
2. Codified at scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. (1988) [hereinafter 1980 Act].
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tant effects even if Commission determinations were always
sustained on appeal. This Article will focus on the effects of
the process on the institutions involved rather than on the ef-
fects of important substantive decisions. Such an approach
renders empirical observations largely impractical and there-
fore this Article will be informal.
I. HAS JUDICIAL REVIEW ALTERED COMMISSION
DECISION MAKING?
The 1979 amendments3 to the Tariff Act of 1930' clarified
the procedures for making Commission injury determinations
in antidumping and countervailing duty investigations review-
able in the CIT.5 One point that should be made clear is that it
is futile to measure the success of judicial review by whether
there has been a shift in the outcomes of Commission determi-
nations. The focus should not be on whether Commission de-
terminations now have a greater tendency to favor domestic
interests over the importer's interests or vice versa. When
Congress spoke about its expectations concerning the substan-
tive effects of the 1979 legislation, it explicitly indicated that it
did not intend the amendments to alter the standards the
Commission applied in making its injury determinations.6
Moreover, even if judicial review has made an outcome-deter-
minative difference, that difference would be difficult to mea-
sure because of changes in the substantive law since 1979.
A. Commission Determinations
The U.S. Congress, in 1979, broadly intended to create
greater transparency regarding antidumping and counter-
vailing duty decision making. The U.S. Senate Finance Com-
mittee stated that the amendments were intended to provide
parties with "increased access to information upon which the
decisions of the administering authority and the [Commission]
are based."'7 While the statute accomplished this end, in part
3. 1979 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 2501 (1988); 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)
(1988).
4. Codified at scattered sections of 19 U.S.C. (1988).
5. 1979 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a (1988); 1980 Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1581(c)
(1988); see S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 74 (1979).
6. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., ist Sess. 74 (1979).
7. Id. at 251-52.
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by requiring the Commission in both its preliminary and final
determinations to notify parties "of its determination and of
the facts and conclusions of law upon which the determination
is based,"8 this requirement was not in itself an innovation.'
The regularization ofjudicial review required by title X of
the 1979 Trade Act provided an important device for clarifica-
tion of the window of transparency.' This influence has ex-
ceeded expectations based on the number of times the CIT has
held that the Commission has inadequately explained its deter-
mination. In several cases, the CIT has remanded determina-
tions to the agency for further explanation when the underly-
ing basis of its determinations were not adequately articu-
lated.'" In doing so, however, the CIT has not taken the
explanation requirement as far as some private litigants have
urged. In particular, the CIT has held that the Commission's
ultimate conclusions need not be stated in statutory terms so
long as its reasoning is clear.' 2  Furthermore, the Commis-
sion's determinations need not make issue findings on a statu-
torily enumerated factor of injury analysis simply because par-
ties submitted evidence on such factor. 13 Additionally, the
CIT does not require the Commission to respond to every ar-
8. 1979 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1671b(f), 1671d(d), 1673b(f), 1673d(d) (1988)
(all containing this language).
9. See Pub. L. No. 93-618, 88 Stat. 2043 (1974); Pasco Terminals, Inc. v. United
States, 477 F. Supp. 201, 219 n.14 (Cust. Ct. 1979); see also id. at 218-19 (discussing
prior law).
10. As the court observed in SCM Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade Comm'n,
404 F. Supp. 124 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977), by the late
1970s "[i]mporters [had] long been granted ... review of affirmative [antidumping]
determinations in proceedings before the Customs Court, notwithstanding the ab-
sence of specific statutory authority for such review." Id. at 130 (citing Imbert Im-
ports, Inc. v. United States, 475 F.2d 1189 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (citing City Lumber Co. v.
United States, 457 F.2d 991 (C.C.P.A. 1972))). As for the uncertainties surrounding
jurisdiction over the Commission's affirmative determinations in countervailing duty
cases on the eve of the 1979 Trade Act, see SCM Corp. v. United States Int'l Trade
Comm'n, 549 F.2d 812 (D.C. Cir. 1977); SCM Corp. v. United States, 450 F. Supp.
1178 (Cust. Ct. 1978).
11. E.g., USX Corp. v. United States, 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987);
Maine Potato Council v. United States, 613 F. Supp. 1237 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
12. E.g., American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd sub nom. Armco, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir.
1985).
13. E.g., Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 577, 587 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1985); Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp. 123,
130 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
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gument presented during the course of its investigations.1 4
Although some private litigants have suggested that this
practice is insufficient, the empirical evidence suggests that the
discipline of review has at least contributed to making Com-
mission explanations more fulsome.' 5 Table 116 presents a
comparison of determinations issued in the year prior to the
effective date of the 1979 Trade Act and determinations issued
during the period August 1988 to August 1989. This table re-
flects the fact that in the past ten years Commission determina-
tions have greatly increased in length. It is the Author's im-
pression that the realization that the CIT judges are now an
expected, regular, and significant audience for Commission
determinations has contributed mightily to this profusion of
words.' 7 It stands to reason that commissioners generally do
not like to have their findings disapproved as inadequate, and
particularly do not like to have to rewrite decisions. This influ-
ence has occurred even though some of the CIT's decisions
have required the commissioners to expendfewer words.' 8
14. E.g., Granges Metallverken AB v. United States, 716 F. Supp. 17, 24 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989); National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 642,
648-49 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); Empire Plow Co. v. United States, 675 F. Supp. 1348,
1354 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987); British Steel Corp. v. United States, 593 F. Supp. 405,
414-15 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1984).
15. This term is used in the sense given by definition 1 of Webster's Ninth New
Collegiate Dictionary-"characterized by abundance: COPIOUS'"-rather than that
given in definition 3b-"OBSEQUIOUS." WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE Dic-
TIONARY 497 (1984).
16. Table 1 is reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
17. Commissioners seldom have occasion to address the influence of court re-
view on their decision making. However, in testimony to the U.S. Senate Finance
Committee, Commissioner Eckes stated:
We don't tend to divide along partisan lines, and I think that is a deliberate
effort on the part of Congress and the Executive Branch to create an in-
dependent, quasi-judicial agency which can be responsive and evaluate mat-
ters on the facts and make decisions that are, after all, going to hold up in
court.
We have to be sensitive to the fact that a judge on the Court of Interna-
tional Trade or on the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit may reverse
us, will review cases involving unfair intellectual property rights or counter-
vailing duty and dumping cases; and I think those factors influence our ap-
proach to the law far more than do partisan consideration.
USTR and ITC Budget Authorization for Fiscal Year 1989: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Int'l Trade of the Senate Comm. On Finance, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 10 (1988) (statement
of Alfred E. Eckes, Acting Chairman, U.S. Int'l Trade Comm'n).
18. E.g., American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984) (finding domestic industry not to be materially injured, Corn-
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B. Investigations
The CIT's influence on the conduct of Commission inves-
tigations has been both crucial and appropriately modest.
Some years ago, comments in certain CIT decisions gave rise
to the apprehension that CITjudges might engage in detailed
supervision of the conduct of Commission investigations. 9
However, in view of the holding of the U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States20
that "[n]othing in the best information rule or its legislative
history defines a standard of investigative thoroughness,"'2 the
CIT has in fact generally refrained from reviewing the Com-
mission's allocation of resources during its investigations.
As the CIT observed in Hannibal Industries, Inc. v. United
States22 "[i]n challenges to the Commission's investigative
thoroughness, the Court has remanded determinations only
for failure to seek necessary information. '23 Like the Federal
Circuit, the CIT has recognized that the Commission faces
great difficulties in obtaining information within its short statu-
tory deadlines. 24 The CIT decisions, therefore, recognize that
the Commission in many cases can neither obtain every piece
of relevant information nor postpone rendering a decision un-
til its information collection is completed. The CIT has not
faulted the Commission for failure actually to obtain informa-
tion, provided that the necessary information was reasonably
sought. Rather, the CIT has only remanded cases for lack of
an adequate investigation in which the Commission failed to
seek information necessary for resolution of the case as the
Commission actually decided it.25
The effect of this case law is salutary. Within the con-
mission need not address whether subject imports are cause of injury), aff'd sub nom.
Armco, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
19. See Roquette Freres v. United States, 583 F. Supp. 599, 604 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984) ("It is incumbent on the ITC to acquire all obtainable or accessible informa-
tion from the affected industries on the economic factors necessary for its analysis.").
20. 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
21. Id. at 1561.
22. 710 F. Supp. 332 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
23. Id. at 336 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
24. d. at 337 (citing Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560
(Fed. Cir. 1984)).
25. See, e.g., Mitsubishi Elec. Corp. v. United States, 700 F. Supp. 538 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), aff'd, 898 F.2d 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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straints of the short statutory deadlines, the Commission staff
endeavors to seek complete information on the issues that the
commissioners may need to resolve. However, the Commis-
sion need not be concerned that the CIT will scrutinize every
step it takes to see whether data collection might in hindsight
have been more effective.
C. Sources of Law
It is well known that the Office of General Counsel within
the Commission (the "General Counsel") regularly writes
predecisional memoranda for the commissioners concerning
legal issues raised by investigations. Until recently, the Com-
mission made these memoranda publicly available. Although
the CIT has properly held that the.General Counsel's views are
not binding on the Commission, litigants have occasionally at-
tempted to use these memoranda against the Commission
when it appeared that the commissioners did not follow the
General Counsel's legal advice.26
In the fall of 1986, the Commission decided to assert its
privilege not to disclose the advice it received from the Gen-
eral Counsel. In doing so, the Commission asserted rights that
the framers of title VII of the 1979 Trade Act had written into
law. Both the 1979 Trade Act and the CIT Rules state that the
record of investigations may include privileged documents.2 7
In every case challenging the Commission's claim of privilege
since 1986, the CIT has declined to permit litigants access to
those portions of the record over which the Commission has
made its assertion of privilege.28
General Counsel memoranda thus are no longer a public
source of reference. General Counsel lawyers who advise the
Commission may now write these memoranda without being
inhibited by the concern that litigants may use their advice
against the Commission if commissioners do not follow it.
26. See Copperweld Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 552, 564 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988) ("Although the Court deems a memorandum from a former official of
an agency charged with administration of a statute to be persuasive authority, such a
memorandum cannot be held an official pronouncement by the agency of the mean-
ing of that statute.").
27. See 1979 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1516a(b)(2)(B) (1988); CT. INT'L TRADE R.
71(c), 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
28. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. United States, 664 F. Supp. 519 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
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D. Legislative Change
Perhaps the most fundamental recent change in the Com-
mission decision making process was a legislative enactment
that may be a byproduct of judicial review. The 1979 Trade
Act authorized the Commission to release certain business
proprietary information under administrative protective order
to representatives of participants in Commission proceed-
ings." The Commission's rules provided for access to limited
amounts of confidential information during its proceedings.3 0
Only on review before the CIT did counsel for litigants gain
access to the entire confidential portion of the record.3 '
In part at the urging of members of the private bar, the
U.S. Congress has now provided access during congressional
investigations to virtually all business proprietary information
collected by the U.S. Department of Commerce and the Com-
mission.3 2 It appears that members of the private bar, scruti-
nizing the records that they obtained after filing suit, decided
that they could represent their clients more effectively if they
could obtain access during the investigations to the confiden-
tial facts presented by other participants. These confidential
facts may provide substantial evidence on which the CIT will
sustain an adverse Commission determination. Advocates may
therefore have found that disclosure only at the time ofjudicial
review of business proprietary information in the record, par-
ticularly that information supporting other parties' conten-
tions, came too late for them to mount rebuttals.
The lobbying that led to the 1988 amendment3 3 can be
read in part, then, as evidence of the success of the CIT in
adhering to the substantial evidence standard and requiring
parties to make their factual cases to the agencies.3 4 The Au-
29. See 1979 Trade Act, 19 U.S.C. § 1677f(b)-(c) (1988).
30. See 19 C.F.R. § 207.7 (1990).
31. See, e.g., Japan Exian Co. v. United States, 1 CIT 286 (1981).
32. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418
§ 1332, 102 Stat. 1207 (1988) (amending 19 U.S.C. § 1677).
33. Id.
34. This result in part reflects the effectiveness of the CIT in adapting its proce-
dures for review of decisions on the record. In an early case, one factor that led the
CIT to look to materials beyond the administrative record appears to have been the
existence of a discovery phase in the case. See Sprague Elec. Co. v. United States, 488
F. Supp. 910 (Cust. Ct. 1980). The case law restricting advocacy to information on
the administrative record was quickly clarified. See, e.g., Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United
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thor is not competent to judge whether access to the confiden-
tial record has improved the advocacy of the bar before the
Commerce Department or the Commission. The Author can,
however, confidently predict that increased access during in-
vestigations will in one respect change the relationship be-
tween counsels' advocacy before the Commission and before
the CIT. CIT case law clearly requires that if a participant is
aware of legal issues raised by the facts of a case during an
administrative proceeding, then the participant must raise the
issue before the agency in order not to be estopped from rais-
ing the issue in court." Increased access during the adminis-
trative process will force litigants to frame their cases below or
they will not be able to make their cases on appeal.
II. WHAT ARE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE DECISION
TO ASSIGN JURISDICTION OVER TITLE VII CASES
TO A SPECIALIZED, TRIAL-LEVEL
COURT?
A. Independence and Expertise of CIT Judges
In granting the CIT exclusive jurisdiction in counter-
vailing and antidumping duty cases brought pursuant to 19
U.S.C. § 1516a, the U.S. Congress regularized an unusual
mode of review. It placed responsibility for appeals on the rec-
ord of title VII decisions in the first instance in the hands of a
trial court. The legislative history is not entirely clear as to the
reason for this decision, but it appears to have been the result
of a recognition that the CIT judges would gain expertise in
import matters by virtue of their de novo jurisdiction in customs
matters, and this expertise would prove useful in deciding
trade cases. 36
There is, it seems to the Author, a natural consequence of
this approach, namely, that the judges of the CIT have strong,
independently-reached views as to the proper administration
States, 85 Cust. Ct. 128, 131 (1980); Melamine Chems., Inc. v. United States, 2 CIT
113 (1981).
35. See, e.g., Wieland Werke, AG v. United States, 718 F. Supp. 50, 55 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1989).
36. The Senate Report to the 1979 Trade Act makes it clear that the review of
antidumping and countervailing duty determinations followed classification and valu-
ation cases to the Customs Court. See S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 249
(1979).
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of the trade laws and that the judges are free to disagree with
each other.
The legal independence of judges of the CIT has recently
been restated by its own reviewing court, the U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Federal Circuit. In Algoma Steel Corporation v.
United States,37 the court considered arguments that Judge
Restani of the CIT had improperly varied from earlier deci-
sions by Judge Newman of the CIT. The Federal Circuit opin-
ion stated that
among trial courts it is unusual for one judge to be bound
by the decisions of another and, if it is to occur, such a rule
should be stated somewhere. That is not done here; with all
the criticism directed by appellants toward Judge Restani
for not following Judge Newman, nowhere is anything
pointed out saying she must. She, herself, accepts an analy-
sis of Judge Newman's decisions as precedents which we
deem in part mistaken, but she is right in making her own
decision nevertheless. 38
It is integral to this system that agency decision makers
will not necessarily view the decision of one judge on the CIT
as definitive if that judge's view will not necessarily be control-
ling in the review of a subsequent agency decision. Whether
or not intended by the Congress that established the system,
this is a natural consequence of the structure, since commis-
sioners and their counterparts at the Department of Com-
merce were themselves appointed to become experts in title
VII law.
The independence of CIT judges and the exclusivity of
the CIT's initial jurisdiction in this respect creates a system of
judicial review and administrative response that affords some
of the problems and benefits of appellate review in the various
37. 865 F.2d 240 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3244 (1989).
38. Id. at 243. To emphasize the independence of CITjudges is not to say that
they do not or should not follow each other's decisions as a matter of stare decisis. In
at least one case in which the Commission urged otherwise, ajudge of the CIT found
that "stare decisis counsels the Court to follow the prior decisions" that had been ren-
dered "by two judges of this Court with broad experience in this complex area of
law." American Lamb Co. v. United States, 611 F. Supp. 979, 981 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1985). That judge, however, properly certified the disputed question for interlocu-
tory appeal, notwithstanding the consensus that judges who had considered the issue
had developed. See American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994, 996-97 (Fed.
Cir. 1986).
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regional circuits. This result may be a counterpart of the fact
that appeal from the CIT lies exclusively in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit.39 By making the Federal Cir-
cuit the sole circuit court to which appeal may be taken, the
U.S. Congress has eliminated one of the traditional rationales
for certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court, namely conflict
among the circuits.40 Generally, CIT decisions resolve dis-
puted legal issues. However, when conflicts appear as a result
of CIT decisions, either among the judges or between the
judges and the agencies, these conflicts can be resolved in the
Federal Circuit.
If the consequences of this system have not always been
fully understood, this is in part because the judges of the CIT
have not always been explicit about their disagreements. For
example, in USX Corporation v. United States ("USX I,,)41 the
CIT applied the law concerning cumulation of the effects of
imports from various countries prior to the passage of the
1984 mandatory cumulation provision. One CIT judge re-
manded the Commission's determination in part because the
Commission had failed adequately to explain why disparate
trends among imports should lead the Commission not to
cumulate. A year and a half later, without citing or discussing
the USX I case, a decision in another case remanded a pre-
1984 decision by the Commission to cumulate imports on the
grounds that "[ilt is unfair to the plaintiff ... to have an injury
determination based on import statistics covering both Japa-
nese and Italian imports when Japanese imports were decreas-
ing and Italian imports were increasing. "42
In USX Corporation v. United States ("USX H "), 4 3 the CIT
specifically observed that firms at times fail to behave as ra-
39. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1292(c)-(d), 1295 (1988).
40. See Sup. CT. R. 17, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988) (specifying split in circuits as
grounds for review upon writ of certiorari). During the ten years with which this
Article is concerned, the Supreme Court has granted no petition for writ of certiorari
from appeal of any decision involving the Commission, whether the case has gone
from the CIT to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit or has involved instead
a Commission determination under 19 U.S.C. § 1337, subject to the direct review of
the Federal Circuit.
41. 655 F. Supp. 487 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
42. Asahi Chem. Indus. Co. v. United States, 692 F. Supp. 1376, 1381 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988), dismissed as moot, 727 F. Supp. 625 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989).
43. 682 F. Supp. 60 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
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tional profit maximizers.44 The CIT, therefore, disapproved a
form of injury analysis based in part on assumptions about the
behavior of profit maximizers. Two days later another judge
reversed a negative preliminary determination of the Commis-
sion in part because "[t]he reliance on irrational conduct to
explain away economic developments which can be analyzed in
a more conventional and traditional way is .. .a sign of arbi-
trariness in the decisional process." '4 5 The latter decision did
not cite or distinguish the former.
The Author has chosen these two examples of unacknowl-
edged conflicts of opinions only because they do not appear to
portend continuing conflicts within the CIT. This is true be-
cause the basis for the Commission's cumulation determina-
tion reviewed in USX I and Asahi are now superseded by legis-
lative action and the decision in Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United
States has been vacated as moot.4 6
Such conflicts reflect predictable institutional characteris-
tics of the CIT. First, the CIT judges have their own views
about the law. Second, prior to the issuance of an individual
opinion, the CIT judges are not required, as are panels of the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, to circulate their
decisions to the other members of the bench in order to assure
consistency with prior statements of the CIT. The Author's
complaint with such examples is not that the judges should be
in disagreement, which appears to be a function of the struc-
ture of the CIT, but rather that their opinions do not always
discuss other decisions of their fellow judges with which their
opinions can be read to disagree. Thus, individual decisions
can falsely appear to set to rest legal issues that the CIT really
has left open or, alternatively, by failing to provide rationales
as to why apparently conflicting statements are in fact harmo-
nious, the opinions can leave it open to the CIT's audience to
find conflicts in the law. Instances of unacknowledged conflict,
which are fortunately the exception rather than the rule, tend
to defeat one of the advantages of placing the initial review
44. Id. at 67.
45. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 685 F. Supp. 252, 256 (Ct. Int'l
Trade), vacated, 887 F.2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
46. Armstrong Rubber Co. v. United States, 887 F.2d 1094 (Fed. Cir. 1988); see
19 U.S.C. § 1677(7)(c)(iv) (1988).
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stage for title VII determinations in a single court rather than
spreading review among the district courts.
The Author has speculated that one advantage that the
U.S. Congress may have calculated in placing review of title
VII determinations in the CIT, which is responsible for the
trial of customs matters, was that the judges of the CIT would
bring from that latter area of their jurisdiction expertise rele-
vant to the former area. Curiously, one of the few subjects of
recent acknowledged conflict among the judges of the CIT
concerned one of the few questions in which their customs law
experience might most inform their trade law decisions:
whether and under what circumstances the CIT may enjoin liq-
uidation of entries pending decision of an appeal of a final title
VII determination when the importer has not requested an an-
nual review from the Department of Commerce. 47 In this in-
stance, however, the judges helpfully stated their disagree-
ment.
It would have been difficult to predict, and is still impossi-
ble to calculate, whether placing review of title VII determina-
tions in an expert court would lead to greater or lesser defer-
ence to the administrative agencies. On the one hand, the
judges of a court who frequently review the decisions of an
agency are less likely to make intrusive decisions that are based
on ignorance of the law or of the exigencies under which the
agencies administer the law. On the other hand, judges who
are used to reviewing issues under a particular substantive law
might regard themselves as experts and, therefore, improperly
substitute their judgment for that of the agency to which ad-
ministration of the statute has been delegated.
This is a question on which, obviously, the jury will for-
ever be out. In cases over the last ten years in which the Com-
mission has appealed decisions of the CIT on the merits to the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the Federal Cir-
cuit has more often than not agreed with the agency's com-
plaint that the CIT did not properly defer to the agency.48
47. See LMI-La Metalli Industriale, S.p.A. v. United States, 720 F. Supp. 176 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 1989) (summarizing case law). Since the original presentation of this pa-
per, the Federal Circuit has resolved the conflict. See Asociacion Colombiana de Ex-
portadores de Flores v. United States, 916 F.2d 1571 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
48. Compare Borlem S.A.-Empreedimentos Industriais v. United States, 913
F.2d 933 (Fed. Cir. 1990) and Bingham & Taylor Div., Va. Indus., Inc. v. United
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Likewise, over the past ten years when private litigants have
appealed CIT decisions affirming Commission determinations
on the merits, the Federal Circuit has invariably affirmed the
decision.49
This is obviously not a fair sample on which to judge the
quality of CIT decisions. The sample is too small and the
Commission has not invariably appealed CIT decisions with
which it reserves the right to disagree, it often being a more
orderly way to administer the proceedings in a given case sim-
ply to comply with a remand order.5 Moreover, the Author
imagines that private litigants and even individual judges of
the CIT do not necessarily assume that decisions of the Fed-
eral Circuit, while binding, are of superior quality to those of
the CIT. The Author's personal impression is that, while by
no means perfect, the CIT generally succeeds at striking the
balance.
B. The Expedition of Decision
One of the benefits that might accrue from assigning juris-
diction over trade cases to an expert court, rather than to the
district courts, is expedition in the rendering of decisions. It is
clear that one of the purposes of the 1979 Trade Act was to
accelerate decision making by the administrative agencies 5
States, 627 F. Supp. 793 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1986), aff'd, 815 F.2d 1482 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
with Marsuda-Rodgers Int'l v. United States, Nos. 90-1298 & 90-1316, slip op. (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 29, 1990) (reversing Marsuda-Rodgers Int'l v. United States, 719 F. Supp.
1092 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989)) and Chaparral Steel Co. v. United States, 901 F.2d 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1990) and American Lamb Co. v. United States, 785 F.2d 994 (Fed. Cir.
1986) and Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556 (Fed. Cir. 1984) and
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. United States, 750 F.2d 927 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
49. See Sandvik AB v. United States, 721 F. Supp. 1322 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1989),
aff'd, 904 F.2d 46 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Algoma Steel Corp. v. United States, 865 F.2d
240 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 3244 (1989); Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United
States, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988); American Permac, Inc. v. United States, 831
F.2d 269 (Fed. Cir. 1987); Armco Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed. Cir.
1985); Border Brokerage Co. v. United States, 646 F.2d 539 (C.C.P.A. 1981); Pasco
Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 634 F.2d. 610 (C.C.P.A. 1980); Voss Int'l Corp. v.
United States, 628 F.2d 1328 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
50. See Molded Pulp Egg Filler Flats from Canada, USITC Pub. 2106, Inv. No.
731-TA-201 (Aug. 1988).
51. "A major objective of this revision of the antidumping duty law is to reduce
the length of an investigation." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 75 (1979),
quoted in Atlantic Sugar, Ltd. v. United States, 744 F.2d 1556, 1560 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
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and, additionally, to achieve expedition on review.52 The CIT
has acknowledged this policy of expedition.53
Nevertheless, the pace of decisions in antidumping and
countervailing duty appeals remains a matter of some dispute.
In the new United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, the
governments of Canada and the United States agreed to de-
sign binational panel reviews, which can be substituted for ju-
dicial review of antidumping and countervailing duty determi-
nations, to be completed within 315 days.54
To accomplish such expedition, the rules governing the
binational panels5 5 dispense with or alter several procedures
that are integral to procedures governing antidumping and
countervailing duty cases in the CIT. For example, those
rules, while requiring a complaint, do not require the filing of
an answer as does Rule 12 of the CIT.56 Whether dispensing
with the answer will deprive the panel of a useful device re-
mains to be seen, but the case law of the CIT indicates that
answers have limited utility in appeals on the record.57 Like-
wise, instead of a rule that provides for entry of a scheduling
order within ninety days of assignment of an action,58 the rules
of the binational panel set the dates for submission of briefs
within sixty days of the filing and also set the time within which
oral argument must be held.59 Since the time for the filing of
plaintiff's motion under Rule 56.1 of the CIT does not usually
run until, at minimum, sixty days after the scheduling order,
the CIT is seldom, if ever, in a position to require briefing as
early as will always occur in the binational panels.
This comparison is not intended to urge on the CIT adop-
52. "The new provisions contemplate... expedited appeals from administrative
determinations." S. REP. No. 249, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 245 (1979); see H.R. REP. No.
317, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 180 (1979).
53. See A. Hirsch, Inc. v. United States, slip op. 88-104, at 6 n.2 (Ct. Int'l Trade
Aug. 3, 1988).
54. United States-Canada Free-Trade Agreement, ch. 19, art. 1904, 14, 102
Stat. 1851, 1878, 100th Cong., 2d. Sess. 297, 517 (1988).
55. Rules of Procedure for Article 1904 Binational Panel Reviews, 53 Fed. Reg.
53,212 (Dec. 30, 1988).
56. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 12, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
57. Cf. Beker Indus. Corp. v. United States, 585 F. Supp. 663 (Ct. Int'l Trade
1984).
58. CT. INT'L TRADE R. 16, 28 U.S.C. app. (1988).
59. Binational Panel Rules 60, 69, 53 Fed. Reg. at 53,220, 53,221 (Dec. 30,
1988).
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tion of a system like that of the binational panel. The panel
rules would eliminate the flexibility that the CIT has, for in-
stance, to handle preliminary disputes such as whether certain
counsel should receive access to business proprietary informa-
tion under judicial protective order. 60 Likewise, thebinational
panel rules do not allow the tribunal, even with the consent of
the parties, to hold up briefing pending decision of controlling
issues in other cases. 6'
Nevertheless, it may be appropriate to raise the question
whether the CIT rules themselves build in unnecessary delay
inconsistent with the general policy of expedition. Some of the
reasons for allowing delay may be historic. As discussed
above, in investigations prior to the 1988 amendments to title
VII, the parties to Commission proceedings did not have ac-
cess to at least most of the business proprietary portions of the
administrative record until they obtained protective orders on
appeal. 62 This reason has now been mitigated, if not elimi-
nated, by the 1988 amendments governing access to business
proprietary information during administrative proceedings.
III. HOW WELL HAS JUDICIAL REVIEW SERVED THE
INTERESTS OF THOSE WHO BRING CASES?
One of the unstated premises of this Article has been that
the 1979-1980 reforms of judicial review, by regularizing pro-
cedures for appeal of Commission determinations, also in-
creased the importance of judicial, review. Table 263 presents
the percentages, by year, of appealable Commission determi-
nations in antidumping and countervailing duty cases that have
in fact been appealed to the CIT. As the table indicates, for
the first years after the 1979 Trade Act, appeal rates were rela-
tively low. For several years beginning in the middle of the
eighties, however, the rate of appeal remained fairly constant
at two-thirds of determinations challenged.
The relatively low rate of appeals in the years 1980-1981
60. Cf A. Hirsh, Inc. v. United States, 657 F. Supp. 1297 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1987).
61. During 1988, briefing in several cases challenging Commission determina-
tions was suspended pending decision by a three-judge panel and then the Federal
Circuit in Fundicao Tupy S.A. v. United States, 678 F. Supp. 898 (Ct. Int'l Trade),
aff'd, 859 F.2d 915 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
62. See supra notes 29-35 (discussing Commission practice prior to 1988).
63. Table 2 is reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
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appears to reflect that it took some time before appeals be-
came regarded as a normal aspect of title VII cases. The early
low rate 'of appeal may reflect that trade lawyers were not fa-
miliar with the appeal process and only gradually became san-
guine aboit recommending appeals as the law concerning the
review function became established.
'The Author is puzzled, however, at how high the rate of
appeal of Commission determinations became. Appeals of
Commission determinations have very seldom accomplished
commercial benefit for the clients on whose behalf appeals
have been pursued. First, the CIT has historically remanded
to the Commission only a minority of determinations. Second,
even in response to remands, the Commission's negative de-
terminations have very seldom changed to affirmatives or af-
firmatives to negatives.
Both of these phenomena should have been predictable.
As for the first, the standard of review only requires that the
Commission's resolution of factual issues be reasonable and
does not require that it be supported by a preponderance of
the evidence. Assuming that the commissioners are simply
conscientious, one would expect their determinations to be
able to meet that standard in the vast majority of cases.
The second phenomenon, that outcomes of determina-
tions seldom change after remands, is a predictable conse-
quence of the nature of the decisions that the 1979 Trade Act
calls upon the Commission to make. Both the ultimate yes-or-
no determinations that the Commission makes about injury,
and most of the underlying findings that it makes to reach
those determinations, are based on a consideration of a
number of factors, none of which is in itself dispositive. An
error in a Commission finding concerning some specific ele-
ment, or a failure by the Commission adequately to explain a
finding, will not generally render the overall determination of
the Commission per se unlawful. On remand, the commission-
ers may look at the overall evidence with a corrected view of
some element of the analysis and nevertheless reach the same
outcome.64
64. See, e.g., USX Corp. v. United States, 698 F. Supp. 234 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988);
Alberta Pork Producers' Mktg. Bd. v. United States, 683 F. Supp. 1398 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1988). From the outset, the CIT was clear that "orders of remand [for further
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In this respect, the usefulness to clients of the judicial re-
view of Commission determinations stands in contrast to the
usefulness ofjudicial review of the Commerce Department de-
terminations. A Commerce Department dumping margin, for
instance, may depend upon resolution of a number of legal
and factual issues. A litigant who is successful in challenging
the Commerce Department's resolution of only one of those
issues may not, in any given case, obtain the reversal of an af-
firmative determination. Nonetheless, the litigant may obtain
a commercial benefit if success on that issue significantly
reduces the margin.
What, then, explains that for years more than half of the
appealable Commission determinations ended up in court?
Certainly members of the private trade bar could offer on this
topic better informed hypotheses than can the Author. Never-
theless, the Author wishes to venture three possible explana-
tions: low marginal cost to clients, the desire of clients to pres-
ent their views another time, and the desire of lawyers to affect
the law.
As this Article indicates, there may be commercial reasons
to challenge a Department of Commerce determination even
when there is little or no chance of obtaining the reversal of
the Commerce Department's overall outcome. Having made
the financial commitment to sue the Commerce Department,
companies may feel that the extra marginal cost to them of also
suing the Commission is low enough that the second case
ought also to be brought. Likewise, if the pursuit of or re-
sponse to investigations by the agencies have involved high
legal costs, the additional costs involved in an appeal may ap-
pear minor. If these factors weigh in their calculation, compa-
nies may conclude that an appeal is worthwhile even given the
low chance that the Commission's basic determination will
change. The Author, however, has no evidence on which to
base the conclusion that these calculations actually take place.
If the Author's experience in private practice is any guide,
there are also times when clients simply cannot believe that the
decision maker did not see the overwhelming persuasiveness
of their point of view and may want to pursue the next avenue
explanation] did not oblige the Commission to arrive at a different substantive re-
sult." SCM Corp. v. United States, 544 F. Supp. 194, 196 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1982).
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for bringing their argument even if there is virtually no chance
of a commercially valuable success. As the CIT observed in
the USX H decision, businesses do not always make decisions
as rational profit maximizers. 6' That clients of trade lawyers
are not immune from this penchant seems to be indicated by
the frequency with which the Commission faces arguments in
court that the commissioners, to decide as they did, must have
ignored the substantial evidence supporting the contrary view.
Such argumentation, of course, misses the point on at least two
scores. First, it is settled past peradventure that substantial ev-
idence may support two conflicting results, both of which
would pass muster on review.66 Second, an agency is pre-
sumed to have considered all of the evidence in the record un-
less there is a specific indication that it did not do so.67 The
CIT, however, is required continually to reiterate these basic
premises.
Finally, the evidence in Table 268 can be read as indicating
that trade lawyers resort to the CIT when it provides the only
"game in town" for vindication of their views of the way title
VII should operate. In 1988, when consideration by the U.S.
Congress of amendments to title VII provided an alternative
"playing field," the rate of appeal of Commission determina-
tions was about fifteen percent less than the rate that had pre-
vailed over the previous three years. The point of some ap-
peals, then, may be to vindicate views of the law that will be
useful in other investigations. The 1988 fall-off may also in
part be attributable to the settling of some legal issues raised
by the 1984 amendments to title VII. Nevertheless, the hy-
pothesis, that counsel brought arguments to Congress rather
than the courts in 1988 while legislation was pending, is sub-
65. USX Corp. v. United States, 682 F. Supp. 60, 67 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988); see
supra note 44 and accompanying text (discussing fact that businesses are not always
rational profit maximizers).
66. See Maine Potato Council v. United States, 617 F. Supp. 1088, 1091 (Ct. Int'l
Trade 1985); American Spring Wire Corp. v. United States, 590 F. Supp. 1273, 1276
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1984), aff'd sub nor. Armco, Inc. v. United States, 760 F.2d 249 (Fed.
Cir. 1985); see also Gifford-Hill Cement Co. v. United States, 615 F. Supp. 577, 587
(Ct. Int'l Trade 1985); Jeannette Sheet Glass Corp. v. United States, 607 F. Supp.
123, 130 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1985).
67. See, e.g., National Ass'n of Mirror Mfrs. v. United States, 696 F. Supp. 642,
648 (Ct. Int'l Trade 1988).
68. Table 2 is reproduced in the Appendix to this Article.
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stantiated by the fact that the rate of appeals made a significant
jump in 1989, to the second highest annual rate in the decade.
It appears that passage of the Omnibus Trade and Competi-
tiveness Act of 1988 returned the CIT to the center of argu-
mentation about the administration of the antidumping and
countervailing duty laws.
CONCLUSION
The prime purposes for the creation of the current system
of appellate review for afntidumping and countervailing duty
cases was to make the operation of the trade laws more trans-
parent and to impose the discipline of accountability on the
decision makers. An understanding of the CIT's success in
helping achieve those ends depends upon an understanding of
the nature of the institution that the U.S. Congress created. It
neither has the primary responsibility for administration of
those laws nor is it the final arbiter as to their interpretation.
CIT judges are authorized to decide cases independently so
that the CIT need not speak with one voice and so that they
may decide cases under a deferential standard of review.
So far as the Author can observe, the system is working
fairly well. In the Author's experience, the commissioners take
seriously the need for transparency and accountability for their
views to a reviewing court. The CIT has become an integral
element in the development of the trade laws, and the CIT
judges have developed such expertise that their decisions,
even when not the last word on some issues, greatly enhance
that development.
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APPENDIX
TABLE 1
AVERAGE LENGTH OF COMMISSION
DETERMINATIONS: YEAR PRECEDING EFFECTIVE
DATE OF 1979 TRADE ACT AND ELEVEN YEARS
LATER*
ANTIDUMPING
2/79- 8/88-- 7.
2/80 8/89 change
1. Total pages per investigation: 13.6 70 510
2. Total pages per case: 9.1 37 400
3. Majority's total per
investigation: 12.9 36.4 280
4. Majority's total per case: 8.6 19.3 220
COUNTERVAILING DUTY
2/79- 8/88- 7
2/80 8/89 change
1. Total pages per investigation: 10.3 70.4 680
2. Total pages per case: 8.4 52.8 630
3. Majority's total per
investigation: 9.9 29.7 300
4. Majority's total per case: 8.1 22.3 270
Figures represent all Commission original determinations from February 1979
to February 1980 and August 1988 to August 1989; remand determinations are not
included. The effective date of 19 U.S.C. § 1516a was January 1, 1980, but the first
Commission determination pursuant to the provision of the Trade Agreements Act
of 1979 and its judicial review provision took place in March 1980. See Spun Acrylic
Yarn fromJapan and Italy, Inv. No. 731-TA-1-2, USITC Pub. No. 1046 (Mar. 1980)
(replacing AA1921-212, 214).
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TABLE 2
RATE OF APPEAL OF COMMISSION
INVESTIGATIONS
TITLE VII
YEAR NUMBER OF
APPEALABLE
CASES
NUMBER OF
CASES
APPEALED
1980 77 31
1981 11 4
1982 86 69
1983 46 25
1984 44 26
1985 55 39
1986 60 39
1987 64 42
1988 15 8
1989 94 72
PERCENTAGE
OF CASES
APPEALED
40%
36%
80%
54%
59%
71%
65%
66%
53%
76%
